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Abstract—Software safety is checked today in regulatory audits, 
which verify software development process compliance to 
regulatory requirements. Ensuring safety is a critical task in 
complex life-supporting systems and despite many existing ways 
of assuring it, unanticipated failure will always be possible. 
Checking process compliance to required standards ensures the 
quality of the processes by which software is developed but does 
not necessarily indicate the quality of the resultant software. 
Since medical device domain is facing an increasing amount of 
device recalls due to software failures, our goal is to explore the 
underlying reasons for this and suggest two improvements within 
this paper. First, we will introduce complicated and complex 
systems to illustrate why there will always be unforeseeable and 
unanticipated situations that could cause the failure of the entire 
system. We will then describe how medical device software 
systems are reviewed for compliance and safety today, 
highlighting the shortcomings in the current methods adopted in 
the medical device domain and suggest the use of systems 
thinking. We then propose two improvements to medical device 
software development where process compliance is supported by 
safety cases and industry-wide learning from experience. 
Keywords—medical device software; software safety; systems 
thinking; learning from failure; Cynefin framework; safety-critical 
systems 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Safety-critical systems such as medical devices embedding 
software are increasingly complex as they are integrating 
various sub-systems together. When building such sub-
systems, the focus needs to be not only on the quality and 
safety of the components within a sub-system but also on the 
interaction of the various sub-systems in order to guarantee a 
safe and functioning overall system. In addition to that, these 
systems reside in an environment of various other systems 
with which it interacts. Systems thinking should be adopted 
when building such complex systems like medical devices as 
it encourages understanding of the system, i.e. any set or 
group of interdependent or temporally interacting parts, by 
examining the linkages and interactions between the elements 
that comprise the entirety of the system [1].  
One system may have various types of problems that 
require different solutions. The Cynefin framework [2] 
provides a way to apply systems thinking as it was developed 
to distinguish between different types of problems and to 
recommend practices to solve them. 
II. BACKGROUND TO SAFETY-CRITICAL SOFTWARE
SYSTEMS 
Systems science argues that the only way to fully 
understand why a problem or element occurs and persists is to 
understand the parts in relation to the whole. In this Section, 
we provide a background to complex safety-critical software 
systems. First, we illustrate the Cynefin framework to 
elaborate why complex systems have a high probability of 
unforeseen failure. We then describe the current software 
compliance practices in the medical device domain.  
A. Cynefin Framework 
Cynefin was first developed by Dave Snowden in 1999 in 
the context of knowledge management and organizational 
strategy as a phenomenological framework, meaning that it is 
about how people perceive and make sense of situations in 
order to make decisions. By 2002, it had been developed to 
include complex adaptive systems theory [2]. In simplest 
terms, the Cynefin framework exists to help us realize that all 
situations are not created equal and to help us understand that 
different situations require different responses to successfully 
navigate them [3].  
Cynefin has two large domains: Order and Unorder, each 
containing two smaller domains - Simple and Complicated in 
the Ordered domain, and Complex and Chaotic in the 
Unordered domain. In the centre of the framework is the fifth 
domain called Disorder where multiple perspectives fight for 
prominence, factional leaders argue with one another and 
cacophony rules. Disorder should be avoided by organizations 
as it disrupts work. In the domain of order, the most important 
boundary of sense-making is between what we can use 
immediately (what is known) and what we need to spend time 
and energy on finding out (what is knowable). In the domain 
of Unorder, distinctions of ‘knowability’ are less important 
than distinctions of interaction; that is, distinctions between 
what we can pattern (what is Complex) and what we need to 
stabilize in order for patterns to emerge (what is Chaotic). In 
the Ordered domain, the whole is the sum of the parts and the 
optimization of the system can be achieved by the 
optimization of the parts. In the domain of Unorder, the whole 
is never the sum of the parts as any action changes the nature 
of the system. Cynefin’s value as a sense-making framework 
lies in helping system decision-makers understand where their 
systems lie among these domains, and by extension, what 
kinds of tools, approaches, processes, or methods are more 
likely to work successfully in a given system [1]. 
To use the Cynefin framework when trying to categorize a 
problem space, one must inspect the relationship between 
cause and effect of the problem space. If the relationship 
between cause and effect is straightforward and obvious to all, 
then your problem is in the simple domain. If the relationship 
between cause and effect is not obvious, but can be analysed 
in advance, then you have a complicated problem. On the 
other hand, if the cause and effect can only be determined with 
the benefit of hindsight, then you are in the complex domain, 
while if there is no obvious relationship between cause and 
effect, you are in the chaotic domain.  
As software development organisations face Complex or 
Chaotic domains they must take on board more new learning, 
more situational assessment and understanding, looking and 
combining capabilities to manage emerging patterns and 
knowledge, applying experiences, looking for diversity of 
opinions and searching for new wisdom or insights. Here 
expertise and experience, collaboration and relationships need 
significant leveraging, as you often diverge / converge while 
working through the potential answers [4]. The mindset here is 
different and it is one that is based on detection. Innovation is 
far more demanding, pushing frontiers, exploring discoveries, 
dealing in a series of exchanges and recognizing emerging 
patterns to piece together real ‘new to the world’ innovations. 
The Cynefin framework can be used to guide an approach to a 
set of different situations, but the characteristics also explain 
enough to help recognize the situation in which one currently 
resides. Simply put, you may have developed a great solution, 
but if you apply it in the incorrect context, it may be worthless 
or worse, harmful [4]. 
Pelrine [5] suggests that software development activities 
tend to be weighted more to the complicated and complex 
domains, with activities related to the coding aspect of 
software development landing in the complicated (or 
sometimes simple) domain, and activities associated with 
project management landing in the complex (sometimes 
chaotic) domain. Tasks dealing with interaction with a 
computer tended to be in the ordered domains, tasks dealing 
with interaction with other humans tended to be in the 
unordered, i.e., complex and chaotic, domains. Although this 
does not suggest that the entire software development activity 
as a whole is complex, it does suggest that many parts of it are 
amenable to analysis and treatment using complexity-based 
tools and techniques. 
B. Complex Safety-Critical Systems 
Many safety-critical systems fail in unforeseeable ways due 
to complex interactions of various components within the 
system as well as interactions with other systems in their 
ecosystem. When we develop these systems we are unable to 
predict exactly how they will be used, how they will respond 
to and what their interactions with their environment will 
produce. So we predict what we can, control what we can but, 
ultimately, we must try the system out and see what happens. 
This is a form of probe-sense-learn suggested by the Cynefin 
framework as suitable for exploring, understanding and 
working with complex domains. In software development, 
such practices correspond to agile methods’ rapid feedback 
loops and iterative development with self-organizing teams 
and highly skilled individuals. Despite various benefits of 
agile methods, to date their quality assurance has relied on the 
knowledge and expertise of the developers supported by 
various forms of automated quality assurance, e.g. automated 
testing, configuration management, defect management. They 
fail to incorporate the quality assurance thinking that is central 
to safety critical systems development. In designing sub-
systems one at a time, the risk management activities are 
limited to the sub-system while the failure of a system as a 
whole either being built or at some time in the future is largely 
not considered. When all possible interactions between system 
components (including sub-systems) and between the system 
and its environment as well as the system’s particular history 
are not accounted for in the development of a complex safety-
critical system, there is a serious cause for concern in relation 
to the system safety [6].  
Cook [7] observed that complex systems contain a large 
number of latent failures all waiting for the right 
circumstances to expose them, and a change to a complex 
system introduces new forms of failure. Cook was describing 
the characteristics of general complex systems, not complex 
software systems. He ventured that complex systems are 
heavily and successfully defended against failure, with 
multiple layers of defenses and where a catastrophe requires 
multiple failures rather than a single point failure. After the 
Therac-25 case in the US, FDA reacted quickly to assure 
proper requirements were in place for complex software 
systems embedded in medical devices by checking the 
medical devices prior to market access for software 
specification and documentation, software quality assurance 
practices, compliance with international standards, software 
design documentation, software testing and coding practices, 
documented software audit trails and usability among various 
others [8]. One of the most important aspects that was learnt 
from that case and is now a common practice in medical 
device software development is the assumption that 
developers have to adopt when building a safe system - 
software can always fail. While it may be true that some 
complex software systems do have defenses in depth against 
failure, it would be difficult to claim that all complex software 
systems have such defenses or that all software developers 
know how to design and develop fault tolerant systems. 
Software systems are modified to correct latent or actual 
faults, to maintain compatibility with component libraries, or 
to introduce new functions. Some of the larger, more critical, 
higher performance e-commerce systems such as Amazon, 
Facebook, Twitter or Netflix are finding that some well-
known design principles really need to be applied rigorously. 
These are principles such as to maintain high cohesion and 
low coupling within and between objects or components, or to 
enforce the SOLID principles of object oriented design. In part 
these principles help ensure that modifications to the system 
do not introduce subtle defects. For example, a system may 
have a component that has a defined interface. That interface 
is generally taken to be a contract between the component and 
anything that invokes any of its services. However, over time 
the component may be modified or enhanced in such a way 
that the interface now behaves in a subtly different way. 
Possibly a parameter changed from one type of integer to 
another type, or a list of enumerated codes was extended. 
Nothing may happen for quite a long time until something 
somewhere else in the system changes in such a way that the 
consequences of the changes to the component now become 
significant. Given that most software now is constructed from 
numerous components that, in turn, may be constructed from 
other components, it is difficult to argue that any software 
system can be made determinate. Software systems do not 
suffer from the wear and tear of hardware systems but they do 
suffer from gradual degradation of their integrity as various 
components are modified. 
C. Medical device software regulation  
Safety is the central concern for medical device software 
development and the development of safe systems is 
rigorously supported by various regulatory requirements 
focusing on development process compliance. In other words, 
a strong emphasis is placed on regulatory oversight and device 
approval before market release to ensure proper verification 
and validation of these devices. Due to the increased 
complexity of software in the devices requiring regulatory 
review, the time to pre-market approval has increased 
tremendously [9]. This results in the impediment of 
innovations in the field as the success of innovations is often 
dependent on the speed of time-to-market. Furthermore, the 
high percentage of medical device recalls due to software 
failures [10] indicates that despite the regulatory efforts to 
oversee the safety and quality of new devices, many faulty 
software systems are still being passed through the compliance 
audits.  
Two of the largest global bodies responsible for issuing and 
managing medical device regulation belong to the central 
governing functions of the US and EU. In the case of the US, 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issues the pertinent 
regulation through a series official channels, including the 
Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Title 21, Chapter I, 
Subchapter H, Part 820 [11]. In the EU, the corresponding 
regulation is outlined in the general Medical Device Directive 
(MDD) 93/42/EEC [12], the Active Implantable Medical 
Device Directive (AIMDD) 90/385/EEC [13], and the In-vitro 
Diagnostic (IVD) Medical Device Directive 98/79/EC [14] - 
all three of which have been amended by 2007/47/EC [15].  
In order to satisfy the regional regulation, there are several 
international standards published to advise and support 
medical device companies on their road to compliance. In 
most countries in the world, the medical device companies 
need to implement a Quality Management System for which 
they could use the requirements and guidance provided in ISO 
13485 [16].  
For a medical device manufacturer to demonstrate that all 
risks have been identified, analysed, evaluated and mitigated 
in their development of a safe medical device, a risk 
management process has to be implemented that would satisfy 
the requirements outlined in ISO 14971 [17]. In the case of 
developing software as or embedded in a medical device, the 
guidance on applying the requirements of risk management 
process to software development can be followed, i.e. 
Technical Report IEC 80002-1 [18].  
IEC 62304:2006 (IEC 62304 from here on) [19], which can 
be used in conjunction with ISO 13485, offers a framework 
for the lifecycle processes necessary for the safe design and 
maintenance of medical device software. As a basic 
foundation, IEC 62304 assumes that medical device software 
is developed and maintained within a QMS such as ISO 
13485, but does not require an organisation to be certified in 
ISO 13485. Therefore, IEC 62304 can be considered to be a 
software development specific supplement to ISO 13485.  
Although ISO 13485 and IEC 62304 are accepted in the 
majority of countries for QMS and medical device lifecycle 
process compliance, there are additional requirements outlined 
by the FDA when the device is to be marketed in the US such 
as FDA QSR [20] for QMS requirements and FDA Guidance 
on Premarket Submission [21] for medical device software 
requirements, respectively. In addition to these, there are also 
the FDA Guidance on Off-the-Shelf software use in medical 
devices [22] and FDA Guidance on Software Validation [23] 
that are widely used in regulatory premarket audits in the US.  
All of the above-mentioned international standards and 
FDA guidance documents provide a process compliance 
approach to quality and safety of medical device software. 
Although the guidance they provide is critical, it may not be 
sufficient to guarantee the safety of the software system that is 
placed on the market. There could be several reasons why this 
could be the case, for example a) following a prescribed 
process description in the system development may not 
guarantee the improved quality or safety of the end product, b) 
the insufficient software development experience and 
knowledge among the auditors who evaluate the quality and 
safety of the software systems, or c) the standards and the 
guidance documents may be lagging behind the innovative 
software development practices implemented to develop the 
increasingly complex medical device software systems. 
Additional goal-based safety management practices should be 
introduced to medical device software development that would 
support the development of safe medical device systems. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SAFETY OF MEDICAL 
DEVICE SOFTWARE SYSTEMS 
There is a clear need for better safety management in which 
compliance based approach is supported by additional safety 
management approaches to allow for a safer system. In this 
discussion we will provide two recommendations for 
improving the safety of medical device software systems. 
First, we will introduce the goal-based approach of safety 
cases, which are widely used in the development of safety 
critical systems in various domains in conjunction with the 
compliance-based approach. Secondly, we will recommend 
learning from actual failures already made throughout the 
industry that would help inform the verification and validation 
processes in the development of complex medical device 
software systems as well as the safety cases to be constructed 
around the risks already realized in complex systems. 
A. Recommendation 1: Using goal-based approach of safety 
cases in conjunction with compliance-based approach in 
complex medical device software systems 
A safety case is a risk-based argument that together with 
corresponding evidence demonstrates that all risks associated 
with a specific goal in a particular system have been 
identified, that appropriate risk controls have been put in 
place, and that there are appropriate processes in place to 
monitor the effectiveness of the risk controls and the safety 
performance of the system on an ongoing basis [24]. 
Manufacturers and operators of safety-critical systems in 
nuclear power plants, petrochemical facilities, railroads, 
defense, off shore oil and aviation industries have long been 
using safety cases to demonstrate that their systems are safe to 
use in a given context.  
Safety cases provide a goal-based approach that aims to 
overcome the shortcomings of the prescriptive compliance-
based approach which is mandatory in medical device industry 
today. In a compliance based approach to safety management 
risks may not be properly understood, hindering  safety as well 
as innovation and progress in the industry [25].  
Safety cases provide a goal towards which the development 
and the product must steer, in other words they support the 
process compliance based safety currently required from 
medical device manufacturers and medical device software 
developers. As suggested in EC TR 80002-1 Annex E, safety 
cases help to structure, document and communicate the 
demonstration of an adequate level of safety of a medical 
device ensuring safety being maintained throughout the 
lifetime of the device [18].  
Although safety cases provide an additional risk 
management approach for developing safety-critical systems, 
there are shortcomings to them as well. First, there is the 
confirmation bias or cognitive dissonance suggesting that 
people are likely to reframe evidence to support their deeply 
held beliefs [28]. This suggests closed loop thinking in which 
developers construct a safety case for the foreseeable risks 
evident through their own perspective of the device and how it 
will interact with the world rather than a systemic and 
objective understanding of how their device will actually 
interact with the world.  
Another serious shortcoming that has been pointed out in 
risk management and safety case arguments is their 
incomplete or inherently faulty reasoning [29]. Fallacies in 
system’s safety argument could undermine the system’s safety 
claims and contribute to a safety-related failure of the system. 
Greenwell et al [29] studied the frequency and types of 
fallacies committed in safety cases of safety-critical systems 
suggesting taxonomy of fallacies that could be used to detect 
them in safety case reasoning to prevent system failures.  
Despite these potential pitfalls of using safety cases, they 
could provide for a more proactive and structured safety 
management for complex medical device systems in line with 
the aims of FDA to ensure more comprehensive approaches to 
prevent safety problems in medical device and healthcare 
industries [24].  
The FDA required that a safety case be included in a 501(k) 
submission for infusion pumps since 2010 [26]. The FDA is 
using the infusion pump safety case as a pilot study to assess 
the results before expanding requirements for their use to all 
510K submissions. While medical device manufacturers 
oppose to the requirement of safety cases on the grounds that 
they are an impediment in getting a device to market, 
alternative means of addressing the increasing rate of Class I 
recalls have not been proposed [27].  
 
B. Recommendation 2: Accommodate industry-wide learning 
from failures  
Current regulatory practices imply that the device 
manufacturer is responsible for determining the acceptable 
levels of risk and for ensuring that the device is adequately 
safe for use in a specific context [6]. There are various 
problems with such assumption where a) the manufacturer 
might not be fully aware of the operational context of the 
device since each user has a different configuration in the 
environment in which the device will be installed, and b) with 
software being subcontracted, the requirements and risks are 
not fully and openly discussed between device/system level 
and software level resulting not only in potential integration 
difficulties but risks which could result in faulty devices.  
For risk management of complex safety-critical systems, 
learning from failures must be ingrained in organizations’ and 
in fact the entire industry’s culture. In order to learn from 
adverse incidents, all data have to be taken into account, 
including the data that cannot immediately be seen. This 
culture must be supported with context-specific learning 
strategies required to effectively defect and analyse failures 
[28]. Organizational learning occurs through shared insight, 
knowledge, and mental models built on past knowledge and 
experience - that is, on memory [30]. Such memory can only 
be built with shared experience that includes the mistakes and 
errors that have been made and from which other 
organizations across the industry can learn in the future.  
Syed points out that the biggest problem of not admitting to 
making a mistake or taking everything into account to analyse 
a potential mistake, is that mistakes that have been made 
become impossible to acknowledge and learned from [28]. 
This, he suggests, is the risk of healthcare industry where the 
mistakes that have been made are not publicly discussed and 
analysed because of the prevalent culture of blame-assertion 
making the possibility for an industry-wide learning from 
failures very small if not impossible. Yet, at a level of 
systemic complexity, success can only happen when we admit 
the mistakes, learn from them and create a climate where it is, 
in a certain sense, “safe” to fail [28]. Similarly to Syed, 
Greenwell also stresses the importance of learning from 
previous observed system failures and incorporating this 
knowledge when developing the safety-case of the new 
complex system [29]. 
FDA today publishes the data about the medical devices 
that have produced faults or failed while in use with the name 
of the manufacturer and a short description of the device itself. 
Unfortunately, there is no public failure repository which 
would allow medical device software developers learn from 
the mistakes of others in the development of innovative safety-
critical devices of their own. The data of such a repository 
could be built by the FDA or European Commission as the 
recalled devices go through detailed analysis. The anonymized 
failures in the system or software should be described in as 
detailed manner as possible. These actual failures can then be 
used by other medical device developers in their pre-
acceptance reviews or hazard analysis to produce a safer 
medical device through industry-wide learning.  
We propose that the regulatory authorities of medical 
devices publish data about failures made in medical device 
software development across the domain that would allow the 
industry to learn and improve the safety and quality of the 
devices placed on the market. We suggest using such data as 
one of the input sources against which validation, verification 
and risk management of new medical device software is 
conducted, as illustrated on Figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Using "Lessons from failures" in verification, validation and risk 
management processes 
Furthermore, the lessons learned from each validation, 
verification and risk management process of new medical 
device software should provide new insight to findings and 
possible failures that would be added to the data collected by 
the regulatory authorities. A similar approach has long been 
applied in the aerospace industry where industry-wide learning 
from failures and potential risks are openly discussed and 
quickly acted upon to prevent further harm in the future [28, 
31]. 
International standards and FDA guidance documents 
cannot be revised so frequently as to be able to keep up with 
the innovative software being developed. That is why an 
actual failures database could contribute to the safer complex 
medical device software systems informing developers of 
known failures in software validation, verification and risk 
management processes as well as in building safety cases that 
target known risks in industry. Failure repository could help 
construct safety cases of complex medical device systems by 
directing attention to failures that have happened and may 
happen again. This would lead to a more realistic and efficient 
risk management when compared to what is expected from 
medical device software developers today - all errors that may 
cause failures be eliminated, which is impossible to reach in 
reality.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is a clear need for better safety management in which 
a process compliance approach is supported by safety cases 
and systems thinking for safer complex medical device 
software systems. Complex systems don’t have a clear 
relationship between cause and effect making it impossible to 
address all errors that can lead to failures. Complex systems 
benefit from hindsight of previous failures to enhance their 
risk management. In other words, safety of medical device 
software systems may further be improved when the industry 
could learn from the previous failures across the medical 
device industry. This requires not only examples but 
information about actual failures in devices that have been 
recalled to ensure that both the developers improve the safety 
of their devices and that the regulatory auditors better ensure 
that faulty devices do not get to the market. With having such 
known database, the safety cases as well as process 
compliance could target these specific areas providing 
evidence on how safety has been ensured in the new devices.  
We advocate that medical device researchers and 
practitioners collaborate in providing data to an industry wide 
knowledge base where actual failures could inform the safety 
case development for new complex medical device systems.  
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